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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3757 
 ___________ 
 
 CHARYLE G. EMEL, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
ELIZABETH SINGLETON, Postmaster; KIMBERLY WAITE, Postmaster; 
STEPHANIE HOUSER, Clerk; ANDREW C. KATERMAN, JR., US Postal Inspector; 
MICHAEL A. OLSAVSKY, Labor Relations Specialist; R.M. WALLACE, FMLA 
Coordinator 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 4-09-cv-00664) 
 District Judge:  Honorable James F. McClure 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 12, 2011 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed May 12, 2011 ) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Charyle Emel appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her 
amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  We 
 2 
 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise de novo review over the District 
Court’s order.  Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007).  For the 
reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  
 Emel worked as a window clerk for the United States Postal Service.  According 
to the allegations in her complaint, the Postal Service terminated her employment on 
August 2, 2005, because it believed that she had stolen $60.  Emel claimed, essentially, 
that she was innocent of the charge but had been framed by her coworkers and superiors.  
She instituted an administrative action with the Postal Service’s Equal Employment 
Opportunity program, alleging that she had been discriminated against due to her race 
and mental illness, but was denied relief.  As a result of the August 2, 2005 incident, she 
was charged in federal court with a misdemeanor, and ultimately pleaded guilty.  In her 
complaint, she alleged that the Postal Service defendants
1
 violated her due process rights 
by firing her without sufficiently explaining their reason for doing so; violated her rights 
under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794,
2
 by discriminating against her on account 
                                                 
1
  Emel sued the following six employees of the Postal Service:  Elizabeth 
Singleton, Kimberly Waite, Stephanie Houser, Andrew C. Katerman, Jr., Michael A. 
Olsavsky, and R.M. Wallace.  These individuals will be referred to as, collectively, the 
“Postal Service defendants.”   
2
  Emel actually sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, but because the term “employer” under the ADA specifically 
excludes the United States and its agencies, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B), we assume that she 
intended to proceed under the Rehabilitation Act.  See Hancock v. Potter, 531 F.3d 474, 
478 (7th Cir. 2008).  The District Court also evaluated the claim as arising under the 
ADA.  However, because it concluded that the claim was barred by the ADA’s 90-day 
statute of limitations, and the Rehabilitation Act also has a 90-day limitation period, see 
29 C.F.R. § 1614.407, its analysis applies with full force to the reformulated claim.  We 
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of her mental illness; and violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968. 
 The Postal Service defendants filed a motion to dismiss.  A magistrate judge 
issued a report that recommended that the District Court grant the motion; the District 
Court approved and adopted the report and recommendation in part.  The Court 
concluded that Emel’s due-process claim — which it treated as arising under Bivens v. 
Six Unknown Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) — and 
Rehabilitation Act claim were barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.  The Court 
further concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim under the RICO statute.  
However, the Court granted Emel leave to amend the complaint as to the RICO claim. 
 Emel filed an amended complaint in which she reasserted her RICO claim.  The 
District Court, adopting the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge, 
concluded that Emel had failed adequately to plead the existence of a pattern of 
racketeering activity, and thus dismissed the amended complaint.  Emel then filed a 
timely notice of appeal. 
 In her appeal, Emel raises two claims.  Her first argument — and the focus of her 
briefs — is that her Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial was violated because the 
District Court dismissed her complaint rather than permitting the case to go to trial.  
Contrary to Emel’s argument, however, “[n]o one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury 
unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined.”  Parklane Hosiery 
                                                                                                                                                             
will proceed as if Emel had raised, and the District Court had ruled upon, a claim under 
the Rehabilitation Act. 
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Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 336 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted).  The District 
Court here concluded, as a matter of law, that Emel had failed to state a claim on which 
relief could be granted.  This legal decision did not invade the province of the jury and 
thus did not violate Emel’s rights under the Seventh Amendment.  See, e.g., Smith v. 
Kitchen, 156 F.3d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 1997).
3
  
 Emel’s second argument is that she is not barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 
U.S. 477 (1994), from recovering money damages from the Postal Service defendants.  
The magistrate judge adverted to Heck only in passing in its first report and 
recommendation, and the District Court did not adopt that part of the report, dismissing 
the Rehabilitation Act and Bivens claims solely on the basis of the applicable statutes of 
limitations.  Thus, Emel is entitled to relief on those claims only if she can show that the 
District Court’s statute-of-limitations ruling was erroneous.  Ironically, if Heck did apply, 
Emel might argue that rather than being time-barred, her Rehabilitation Act and Bivens 
claims have not yet accrued.  See Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091, 1098 (2007) 
(explaining that the Heck rule “delays what would otherwise be the accrual date of a tort 
action until the setting aside of an extant conviction which success in that tort action 
                                                 
3
  Although Emel invokes the Seventh Amendment, her argument could also 
be construed to challenge the District Court’s dismissing her case without holding an oral 
hearing.  However, this argument also fails.  The District Court has discretion as to 
whether to hold a hearing.  See Dougherty v. Harper’s Magazine Co., 537 F.2d 758, 761 
(3d Cir. 1976); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.  Here, Emel was accorded several 
opportunities to be heard:  she was permitted to file an amended complaint, she twice 
filed briefs in opposition to the Postal Service defendants’ motions to dismiss, and she 
twice filed objections to the magistrate judge’s reports and recommendations.  In these 
circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the District Court to determine that an 
oral hearing was unnecessary to determine, as a legal matter, whether Emel’s amended 
complaint adequately stated a claim.   
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would impugn” (emphasis omitted)).  However, we agree with Emel that Heck is not 
implicated by these claims.  The claims challenge the Postal Service defendants’ conduct 
in terminating her employment, and a judgment in her favor would therefore not 
“necessarily imply the invalidity of [her] conviction.”  Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.  Hence, 
Emel’s Heck argument does not help her in this appeal.   
We have also independently reviewed the District Court’s opinion, and discern no 
error.  As the District Court held, Emel’s Bivens and Rehabilitation Act claims accrued, 
at the latest, when the final decision in Emel’s administrative action was issued — that is, 
November 16, 2006.  She was required to file her Bivens claim within two years of that 
date, see Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 (3d 
Cir. 1988), and her Rehabilitation Act claim within 90 days, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.407.  
However, she filed her complaint on April 10, 2009, well past the applicable deadlines.  
We similarly agree with the District Court’s disposition of Emel’s RICO claim.  In 
support of this claim, she has presented only conclusory or irrelevant allegations, which 
are wholly insufficient.  See, e.g., Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Emel’s 
amended complaint.  
 
